The following graph is cross-posted from ‘Data for Progress:

At Politico, Elena Schneider writes, “Rep. Greg Casar wants Democrats to “pick villains” in the GOP and drop purity tests in primaries…The Congressional Progressive Caucus chair, a 35-year-old Texas millennial who took over its leadership in December, thinks his party lost its working-class identity, while becoming too cautious and too boring in its fight against Republicans. He’s meeting privately with other members to discuss ways to steer the party toward a more populist economic message — being “known as the party of working people, first and foremost,” Casar said — and he’s mounting an aggressive public relations campaign to push it…Casar, along with Reps. Chris Deluzio (D-Penn.) and Pat Ryan (D-N.Y.), have been meeting informally with about a dozen Democratic members to talk about how best to shift the party into emphasizing economic populism..“Republican officials have figured out how to elevate social issues that impact only a small number of people and make them the dominant issues in elections,” Casar said. But after “knocking on thousands of doors” in Texas, even the most conservative voters “never opened the door and said, ‘Thank God you’re here. I want to talk to you about the appropriate level of testosterone for somebody to compete in the NCAA [sports].”…”If we’re willing to say…the richest people on the planet want to steal your Social Security check in order to enrich themselves and their friends, well, now you’re cooking with gas,” Casar said. “Be willing to explain that — to win a voter’s trust by telling people we are willing to actually go up against the villains that are screwing them over.”…“There’s a lot of different approaches to the economy that can appeal to working class voters, that involve honoring hard work, ensuring that everybody has an opportunity to earn a good life and that doesn’t involve ‘fighting the oligarchs,” [Third Way Founder Matt] Bennett said. “If that becomes their litmus test, then we’re right back in the same boat.”

 In her “Letters from an American” Substack post for March 30, Heather Cox Richardson notes that “the top seven donors to the 2024 political, cycle together gave almost a billion dollars to Republicans, with Elon Musk alone contributing more than $291 million. The list, compiled by Open Secrets, shows that Democratic donors don’t kick in until number eight on the list, former New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg, who gave slightly more than $64 million to Democrats. George Soros, the Republicans’ supervillain, didn’t make the top 25. As those wealthy donors wish, the Trump administration is shredding the post–World War II government and has prioritized tax cuts for the wealthy and corporations…Trump is digging into the position that some people are better than others and have the right to rule. Today he told NBC News that he is considering a third presidential term, although that is explicitly unconstitutional. “I’m not joking,” he said, “There are methods which you could do it.”

At The Bulwark, Lauren Egan shares some observations about demographic change that will have a big impact on Democratic strategy in the near future: “Thanks to a decades-long flood of cross-country migration from states like California and New York to states like Texas and Florida, the South has emerged as an economic, political, and cultural powerhouse. Tech companies are relocating to Austin; movies are increasingly being produced in Atlanta; and more students from the Northeast are attending SEC schools—and then staying in the South after graduating—than ever before. The region accounted for more than two-thirds of all job growth across the United States since early 2020, and it now contributes more to the national GDP than the Northeast does…All of that means that the South is on track to make historic gains in the 2030 census. Florida and Texas are projected to gain four or more congressional seats, while North Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee could each gain a seat. Meanwhile, reliably blue states like California could lose as many as five; New York might lose three. Illinois, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin could also see declines…All told, nearly four in ten Americans could hail from the South by the next census, according to a recent Brennan Center analysis. That not only means the path to a House majority runs through the South—it also means the party’s reliance on the “Blue Wall” will no longer be viable in future presidential elections. (The number of Electoral College votes a state gets is determined by how many congressional districts it has.)”

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute,  and author of major works of political analysis, is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

Unless you have been living without an internet connection for the last few weeks or so, you have certainly encountered a book called Abundance, which argues that Democrats must face up to the failures of liberal governance and embrace a politics of plenty. I note somewhat immodestly that I was for an “abundance agenda” before it was cool.

Back in 2022, when I was exasperated at the direction of my lifelong political party, I wrote a three-point plan to fix the Democrats.

The second point was precisely that “Democrats must promote an abundance agenda.” It would be good politics and good policy, I argued, for the party to take steps to increase the supply of essential goods and services. They should embrace regulatory reform, efficient governance, and the rapid completion of public and private projects—things that had been the purview of Republicans and the center-right. And they should back technological innovation and productivity rather than settling for the redistribution of scarce resources.

In other words: more stuff people actually want, more of the time.

More and more people seem to agree.

With Abundance, the OGs of the abundance movement, journalists Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson, have aimed to write a definitive mission statement. But they aren’t alone. An ever-growing number of organizations, networks, blogs, and other initiatives are devoted to aspects of an abundance agenda, from housing to energy to transportation infrastructure to technological progress.

More and more, liberal analysts now lament Why Nothing Works, as the title of Marc J. Dunkelman’s new book puts it, and elicit widespread nods of agreement, rather than howls of denial. Brian Deese, Joe Biden’s director of the National Economic Council and a paid-up member of the Democratic economic establishment, just published a lengthy essay in Foreign Affairs on “Why America Struggles to Build”—the clear implication being that the Biden administration failed to do so.

Given my belief that without an abundance agenda this country is more likely to limp along than to soar, I can only applaud these developments. From the profound shortage of housing where America needs it most, to our shockingly expensive and slow infrastructure projects, this country is not delivering what its people need.

One infamous example—and one the new Abundance book focuses on—is California’s failure to build a high-speed rail line between San Francisco and Los Angeles. “Imagine what a great project that would be to rebuild America,” said then–President Obama the year after Californians voted in favor of the new line. It was supposed to cost $33 billion and be up and running by 2020. The cost is now expected to be more than triple that figure. The first tracks were laid only this January, and the first third of the line is not projected to open any sooner than 2030. As Klein noted in a recent New York Times piece, China has built more than 23,000 miles of high-speed rail since 2008, when Californians voted to approve a plan to build the new line.

Why the delay? A big part of the answer is an overly burdensome environmental review process. As Klein explained, “Trains are cleaner than cars, but high-speed rail has had to clear every inch of its route through environmental reviews, with lawsuits lurking around every corner.”

But while the abundance agenda is badly needed, how likely is the actually existing Democratic Party to embrace it? In some alternative universe there may be a Democratic Party for whom this would be an easy sell. But this Democratic Party in this universe? I have my doubts.

Let’s start with an awkward reality: The Democrats were just in power for four years and did absolutely nothing that would recognizably be part of this agenda. Their revealed preference was to spend money on popular party priorities like the massive American Rescue Plan and the deceptively named Inflation Reduction Actrather than reform the system so things actually got done and money was not wasted.

Stories of Biden’s boondoggles are already passing into legend: the failure of a $42 billion allocation for rural broadband in the 2021 infrastructure bill to connect anyone at all so far; the absurdly slow build-out of EV charging stations from a $7.5 billion allocation in the same bill—only a few dozen chargers are now operational from the 2021 bill.

There are countless examples of such inefficiencies and delays. The culprit is a Democratic Party that puts ideology and special interests ahead of good governance. It is committed to ensuring that development is not socially harmful in any way, and does not transgress the interests of any “stakeholders.” In reality, that amounts to a promise that nothing will get done. The result is endless paperwork and litigation by those stakeholders—or, more accurately, interest groups that claim to represent those stakeholders. This includes countless environmental and “social justice” NGOs, local NIMBY groups and, of course, the army of lawyers who make their living from this sort of thing. Costs balloon and projects are delayed.

Nothing demonstrates the problem more clearly than the ongoing effects of National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations. These environmental review laws, first passed in 1970, have become a major obstacle to progress and prosperity. As the liberal economist Noah Smith points out:

NEPA and other environmental review laws (like California’s CEQA) are the most important kind of regulation holding back American development, be that housing, green energy, or reindustrialization. These are procedural requirements—even if a development project obeys every single substantive environmental law, NEPA allows NIMBYs to sue to force the developer to complete years of onerous paperwork for the courts before proceeding. This exerts a massive chilling effect on new projects, because developers know they’ll get sued and might have to spend years on paperwork….

America went way too far with anti-development regulation in the 1970s, and left itself utterly unprepared to deal with the new challenges of the 21st century—the housing shortage, Cold War 2, the green energy transition, and re-industrialization. We froze our built environment in amber in the 70s.

Progressives had the chance to change all that when it become apparent that a 1970s-style world was no longer sufficient. They passed on that chance.”

And what do progressives have to say about fixing this issue? Almost nothing. Their ideology, “the groups,” the nonprofit-industrial complex, and the priorities of liberal, educated voters to whom so many Democratic politicians are beholden all make it extremely difficult for the party to tackle this kind of problem—or embrace many other parts of the abundance agenda.

Read more…

The following article, “What’s Missing in Democrats’ Economic Debate?” by Dustin “Dino” Guastella is cross-posted from The Center for Working-Class Politics newsletter via substack.com:

Liberals are in the middle of an economic debate over the “abundance agenda,” and whether the electorate wants an “angry moderate” or a “combative centrist” to deliver a sensible pro-growth economic program. But what’s missing in all of this, at times generative, debate is discussion of the very thing the economy needs so badly: more power for workers.

A new consensus has emerged, (or rather, an old consensus has reemerged) among liberals. From populists to self-declared neoliberals, all have agreed to leave the culture war behind. They, by and large, agree that the Democrats need to win back the working class. And they agree that delivering real economic gains in policy, with a laser focus on economic rhetoric, is the way to do it.

Some on the Left have been banging this drum for a long time. Others have returned, like the prodigal son, to their old-ways. “It’s the economy stupid!” was once the unofficial slogan of the 1992 and 1996 Clinton campaigns. And true to form, today the Clintonian think-tank Third Way again insists that every time Democrats open their mouths they ought to say something about the economy. Prominent liberal writers like Matthew Yglesias have made the same case. And now New York Times journalist Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson have released a book “Abundance” which make the positive case for exactly how Democrats can talk about the economy.

This is a good development, and the debate has generated some good ideas. But for all the newfound attention given to economic issues, moderate liberals seem surprisingly silent on the question of working-class jobs and wages. For all their talk about the need to win them back, the emerging Democratic economic consensus seems really short on an agenda for workers. And that’s a problem. After all, the Democratic brand is underwater among blue-collar workers specifically on the question of work itself. As POLITICO recently reported:

Just 44 percent of those polled said they think Democrats respect work, while even fewer — 39 percent — said the party values work. Only 42 percent said Democrats share their values. A majority, meanwhile — 56 percent — said Democrats are not looking out for working people.

Many moderates are under the impression that working-class voters are helplessly conservative on economic questions. And so, much of the new policy agenda for centrist Democrats looks a lot like the old policy agenda for centrist Democrats. That is, its what economists call a “supply-side solution” to economic hardship. It’s about lowering costs. Not raising wages.

Cut red tape, incentivize growth, unleash the awesome power of the market to bring costs down, down, down.

There is, of course, some usefulness in this approach. It’s obscene, for instance, that almost every infrastructure project is mired in bureaucratic and legal hangups that result in insane delays and astronomical costs. But loosening supply-side constraints, as helpful as they might be, probably isn’t enough to fix whats really broken.

The fundamental problem in the economy can be summed up as follows: the rich have too much money and workers have too little power to force them to invest it.

Even preeminent neoliberal economist Larry Summers has, belatedly, recognized this. He complains of an “investment death” and a “savings glut.” In other words, the hoarding of wealth by the über-rich has become a huge drag on global economic growth. Billionaires just won’t invest their money at the scale needed to promote broad economic prosperity. And even when they do, their outsized social and political power ensures that wages remain stagnant. By removing supply-side constraints we could induce more investment but, given the falling costs of capital goods and the downward pressure on wages posed by automation, supply-side solutions won’t do much to prevent even more money accumulating at the top.

What’s needed, then, is more power for workers, so they can demand higher wages and increase the general rate of effective demand.

Now, some moderates may reply: ‘Okay, okay, but no one has any appetite for that!’ It’s true that many working-class voters aren’t interested in traditional tax-and-redistribute welfare programs. That’s why Third Way’s big economic idea is “middle-class tax cuts.” But is this really the horizon of progressive economics? Hardly.

It turns out workers have a number of good (and popular!) ideas for tilting the economy away from the power of the rich. As we noted a few months ago:

Our analysis of a host of questions from the 2021–22 waves of the ANES, GSS, and CES indicates strong working-class support for progressive economic policies, ranging from the 87.9 percent of working people who support lowering prescription drug prices to the 67.9 percent in favor of increasing taxes on the wealthy. The list goes on: 69.1 percent of working-class Americans favor import limits to protect US jobs, 64.8 percent prefer greater investments in state education spending, and 54.8 percent even have a positive view of a federal jobs guarantee. Likewise, substantial majorities of working-class Americans support policies to strengthen workers’ economic leverage, including 70.5 percent who support raising the minimum wage, 68.8 percent who favor putting workers on corporate boards of directors, and 54.8 percent who favor labor unions (a figure on the low side of other credible estimates).

In a forthcoming analysis, the Center For Working Class Politics, finds broad support for a number of populist economic programs that increase the power and leverage of workers and promote a more equal economy. What’s more, we believe that new policy proposals to stop stock buybacks that induce mass layoffs, legislation to speed up first contracts for newly unionized workers, and means to trigger big investments in high-wage industries, are no less likely to have popular support if only there were progressive tribunes to champion them.

Crucially, these policies all have a lot to do, not just with economic fairness, but with jobs and work. And as Sherrod Brown recently noted, to win back workers, progressives must put “the dignity of work at the center” of all they do.

Populist policies built around that goal are one means to do that.

Why is Team Trump moving so fast in its tumultuous executive actions? At New York I examined one explanation that might provide a silver lining for Democrats, at least if democracy survives the experience.

Various theories are kicking around to explain the speed and lack of caution surrounding the initial blizzard of executive actions in the second Trump administration. The most conventional is simply that having four years to mull what happened in his first term, Trump and his top advisers came prepared to hit the ground running. That may account for developments like the early start on Cabinet nominations, but there have been plenty of second-term presidencies that did not begin with breaking every norm constraining executive powers, so something else is clearly going on.

One very plausible explanation is that both Trump and Russell Vought, the OMB director at the wheel of the executive branch, are very invested in a tremendous expansion of presidential powers at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches of the federal government. Moving ahead rapidly with executive orders, funding “freezes,” and plans for presidential impoundments made a lot of sense as part of a very deliberate power grab.

Then, even more obviously, there’s the truly unanticipated X-factor in Trump 2.0: Elon Musk and his DOGE initiative, which was apparently put together on the fly at some point between Election Day and Inauguration Day with about as much preparation as might normally be associated with a Tesla joyride in the country. Musk is famously deploying the same shock-and-awe tactics he used in earlier corporate takeovers, based on the Silicon Valley motto of “move fast and break things.” He has indeed done that, with the chortling glee of a toddler overturning a Lego structure. So perhaps he’s running wild, beyond the control of the congressional leaders and the Cabinet whose authority he has usurped. Or maybe Musk and Vought together have joined forces to hit the disruption accelerator.

But at some point it must occur to the more thoughtful minds of Team Trump — Susie Wiles, anybody? — that the politics of this onslaught of chaotic activism is a bit backward. For generations, conservatives have come to Washington, D.C., clutching an agenda of limited government and tax cuts. By and large, the former goal, which requires cuts in highly popular federal programs and deflationary reductions in federal employment and contracting, is tough politically; it’s the broccoli on the plate, allegedly good for you but unpalatable without hollandaise sauce. Tax cuts supply the tasty dessert. Serving up dessert first is the best way to encourage broccoli consumption. That’s the lesson of George W. Bush’s successful push for tax cuts and then budget cuts in the early 2000s. The strategy was known as “starving the beast” (as anti-tax guru Grover Norquist put it): Deny “the welfare state” (the early 2000s term for the “deep state”) the resources to expand its programs and services and budget cuts would flow naturally and with less public angst.

That’s not how Team Trump is proceeding. And in fact, on top of all the pain and paralysis Trump and Musk are causing throughout the federal government, the administration is insisting on moving fast with another unpleasant agenda item: widespread tariffs, which both economists and the public believe will reignite inflation — the very issue that most clearly led to the 2024 election result — and could even induce the ultimate hell of stagflation, a shrinking economy with spiraling prices.

So why is the administration and its party insisting on front-loading so many politically hazardous actions? The most likely answer is that they believe they are living on borrowed time and have to smash the deep state and then grab the tax cuts made possible by budget cuts before the American people react in ways that might quickly reduce their power. For many years now, it’s been clear that an agenda of cutting programs like Medicare and Medicaid (and perhaps even Social Security via the indirect method of disabling its administration) and shutting down major agencies like the Department of Education in order to finance tax cuts for the rich was not a big crowd-pleaser. So upon taking office, the leaders of Trump 2.0 had a distinct choice: Build up their political capital carefully with popular steps that would give them the credibility to take less popular steps later, or move fast and get what they wanted while they can. It does make a certain logic, and not just for political neophytes like Musk or stone anti-government Christian nationalist ideologues like Vought, but for the 78-year-old narcissist serving in his final public-sector job.

In an interview with Ezra Klein, conservative wonk Santi Ruiz explained the psychology as reflected in DOGE’s modus operandi:

“[W]hen you talk to people in and around DOGE, you hear the debt come up over and over again — that if we don’t take this one opportunity now, while the window is open before the midterms, before public opinion naturally swings back and we lose the House, there’s a green field to run into to try and cut, cut, cut. And this will never happen any other time.

“There’s a strong instinct here that this is our one shot. So if we’re going to err on one side, we have to err on the side of cutting too much….

“[T]hat’s very much the instinct: The Dems are going to stop us. They’re going to come in, and we’re going to do crazy oversight in the House in a year and a half. Public opinion will just change over time because cutting things is unpopular.”

From that perspective, which may be shared more broadly within Team Trump than we realize, it doesn’t really matter what the polls show, or how more rational Republican politicians focused on their own futures want, or whether the whole revolution is doomed to eventual defeat. It’s all carpe diem, baby, and let tomorrow take care of itself.

To gain a better understanding of how Americans view and relate to our two dominant political parties, give a read to “The Partisanship and Ideology of American Voters” at the Pew Research Center, which was published a bit less than one year ago,  An excerpt: “The partisan identification of registered voters is now evenly split between the two major parties: 49% of registered voters are Democrats or lean to the Democratic Party, and a nearly identical share – 48% – are Republicans or lean to the Republican Party…Four years ago, in the run-up to the 2020 election, Democrats had a 5 percentage point advantage over the GOP (51% vs. 46%)…The share of voters who are in the Democratic coalition reached 55% in 2008. For much of the last three decades of Pew Research Center surveys, the partisan composition of registered voters has been more closely divided…About two-thirds of registered voters identify as a partisan, and they are roughly evenly split between those who say they are Republicans (32% of voters) and those who say they are Democrats (33%). Roughly a third instead say they are independents or something else (35%), with most of these voters leaning toward one of the parties. Partisan leaners often share the same political views and behaviors as those who directly identify with the party they favor…The share of voters who identify as independent or something else is somewhat higher than in the late 1990s and early 2000s. As a result, there are more “leaners” today than in the past. Currently, 15% of voters lean toward the Republican Party and 16% lean toward the Democratic Party. By comparison, in 1994, 27% of voters leaned toward either the GOP (15%) or the Democratic Party (12%)…While the electorate overall is nearly equally divided between those who align with the Republican and Democratic parties, a greater share of registered voters say they are both ideologically conservative and associate with the Republican Party (33%) than say they are liberal and align with the Democratic Party (23%)…A quarter of voters associate with the Democratic Party and describe their views as either conservative or moderate, and 14% identify as moderates or liberals and are Republicans or Republican leaners.”

“Will Democrats finally start to place class issues at the center?,” Michael Sean Winters asks at The National Catholic Reporter, and writes: “There’s a very clear correlation between how many immigrants there were in a county and how much Trump’s vote share increased,” Shor said. “In counties like Queens, N.Y., or Miami-Dade, Fla., Trump increased his vote share by 10 percentage points, which is just crazy.”… How crazy? “Our best guess is that immigrants went from being a Biden plus-27 group in 2020 to a group that Trump narrowly won in 2024. This group of naturalized citizens makes up roughly 10% of the electorate.”…When Trump and Elon Musk portray themselves as blowing up “the establishment,” working-class voters love it. The establishment hasn’t done a lot for them in the past 40 years of neoliberal economics practiced by both parties. They aren’t as scared of tariffs as college-educated people because free trade decimated their towns in the 1990s and they do not have robust 401(k)s taking a hit in the markets today…The establishment — the term was coined by the late, great Henry Fairlie — is disconnected from the working-class…Trump seized on the disconnect. He may be selling snake oil, but at least he pays attention to working-class people and does not disrespect them or their choices publicly. He shows up at wrestling matches. He never speaks in academic jargon. He identifies working-class grievances and offers up a simplistic explanation or enemy as the source of those grievances… It worked in 2024 and it will keep working unless the Democrats learn what’s on the mind of the people who shower after work.”

In “The Emerging Democratic Minority,”John Judis writes at Compact: “Democrats began to lose support within the working class (defined roughly in polling terms as voters without a college degree) as far back as the 1960s, but they reached a new low in 2016 when Hillary Clinton lost this demographic by three points—and the white working class by 27 points. (In citing poll numbers, I give precedence to Catalist post-election compilations when comparing 2016 and 2020, AP/VoteCast on 2024 numbers, and the Edison Exit polls on any trends that go back before 2016.  Where there is a wide disparity, I will try to explain the difference.) Biden gained back some of these votes in 2020, but Kamala Harris lost them by 13 points and the white working class by 31 points. Harris lost 16 percentage points among Latinos without a college degree and three points among blacks without a degree…The Democratic share of the rural and small-town vote began falling in 1980, but the big decline, as political scientists Nicholas Jacobs and Daniel Shea demonstrate in The Rural Voter, began with the 2010 midterm election, when the Republicans flipped 31 House seats in rural districts and 20 in districts that mixed rural and urban. Democrats reached a new low of 34 percent among rural voters in 2016. Biden rebounded slightly, but Harris dropped back to Clinton’s level of support…Beginning in 1980, Democratic presidential candidates began enjoying more success among female than male voters. That is what the term “gender gap” referred to. In the 1992, 1996, 2008, 2012, and 2020 presidential elections, Democratic victories were attributable to this gender gap. But when Republicans won elections, they enjoyed rising success among male voters that overcame the Democratic gender gap. In 2016, Clinton’s margin among women allowed her to win the popular vote, but she did worse among men than Barack Obama had. In 2024, male voters went over to Trump by 13 points, easily overcoming Harris’s six-point margin among women. Key male constituencies included black males, among whom Trump gained 12 points from 2020, Latinos, among whom he gained 19 points, and young (18–29-year-old) men, among whom he gained 14 points…In the 2024 election, Democrats’ opposition to strict border security and support for a transgender-rights agenda that went far beyond protection from discrimination, including the participation of biological males in women’s sports, proved to be part of the party’s undoing.  Trump’s most effective ad in wooing swing voters cited Harris’s support for state funding of sex-change operations for detained illegal immigrants.

Judis continues, “The most important single issue in the election cycle was the Biden administration’s lax stand on illegal immigration…In a poll of voters in factory towns in swing states, Lake Research found that the single greatest “negative perception” of the Democrats was that they “were obsessed with LGBT transgender issues instead of focusing on kitchen table economic issues.” In a post-election poll of swing voters conducted by YouGov, Greenberg Research found that the top reason voters opposed Harris was they believed she was for “open borders.” That was followed by prices being too high and by Harris and the Democrats’ assumed support for transgender athletes and for “ultra-left and woke Democrats.”…According to a Brookings study, 45 percent of the men aged 18 to 29 say they face discrimination as men. According to a Pew poll, 38 percent of men who identify as Republican say “women’s gains have come at the expense of men.” As the “mommy party,” the Democrats were sure to invite the wrath of many male voters. Many of these voters were also working-class and many lived in rural areas and small towns, but Harris also lost young men with college degrees—a group that was formerly in the Democratic corner…It may take another defeat or two in national elections to convince leading Democratic politicians that they have to listen to the public rather than to their activist lobbies or their billionaire donors. For me, that represents a looming disaster. For all their faults, the Democrats remain the party of constitutional adherence and of a government dedicated to overcoming the failures to which a society is prey if it lets the market run free.”

An idea is kicking around the chattering classes that needs to be addressed critically, so I tried to do so at New York:

Without any question, rank-and-file Democrats are furious right now. They are angry at the Trump administration, of course, for the multi-pronged attack underway on the public sector; on judges; on immigrants; on universities; on our allies; and on the U.S. Constitution. They are angry at a Republican Party that is egging on Trump, Elon Musk, Russell Vought, and the unruly gang of social-media trolls, Christian nationalists, and tech bros who have been empowered by the new administration, at the expense of congressional Republican authority. But most of all, they’re angry at their own party’s leaders for losing a winnable 2024 election and then retreating into confusion and fecklessness in dealing with emergency conditions that look a lot like every authoritarian takeover in modern world history.

Democrats are losing confidence in their party at historic rates, with Chuck Schumer’s abrupt decision to abandon a filibuster against a GOP/Trump spending bill becoming a real flash point. A recent Quinnipiac survey showed 49 percent of self-identified Democrats disapproving the job performance of the congressional party. The palpable unhappiness at the grassroots has led multiple observers to suggest that we may be on the brink of an intraparty revolt similar in intensity and significance to the tea-party movement that convulsed Republicans during the Obama administration, and which (many believe) paved the way for the equally angry MAGA movement that is now in charge of the country.

It’s true that the tea party of the right began with angry grassroots Republicans infuriated by Barack Obama’s 2008 election victory, the 44th president’s bold legislative agenda, and the GOP Establishment’s difficulties in countering it. And it did most strikingly manifest itself in a midterm primary upset of a congressional Republican leader, when a nobody named Dave Brat defeated House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in his Virginia stomping grounds. We are now being told that Democrats in Congress who aren’t sufficiently “fighting” Trump could meet the same fate.

But the differences between the current moment and the one that sparked the tea-party movement are at least as striking as the similarities. The most important difference is that the uprising on the right was sharply ideological, and went far beyond demands for greater partisan combativeness. Its impetus was pretty clearly the bipartisan actions taken to mitigate the financial collapse that occurred late in the Bush administration, including the TARP bailout of investment institutions, but more importantly, the relief provided to regular folks who defaulted on mortgages.

The tea-party movement’s moment of birth was famously “Santelli’s Rant,” an on-air tirade by business telejournalist Rick Santelli aimed at the deadbeats turned freeloaders who took on unsustainable debt and expected their more responsible fellow citizens to rescue them with taxpayer dollars. This very pointed complaint metastasized into broad-based resentment of income redistribution and a near-libertarian belief that much of the modern welfare state violated the U.S. Constitution. While tea-party protests may have been aimed at TARP and then Obamacare, they really represented a revolt against the New Deal and Great Society legacy of beneficent government and a clear and powerful right turn for the Republican Party. Much of what the hard-core conservative House Freedom Caucus stands for came right out of the tea-party movement, along with some significant MAGA flourishes added by Donald Trump.

While progressives certainly believe the unprincipled character of party centrists has contributed materially to Trump’s return to power and the paralysis of congressional Democrats, it’s not accurate to say that the current wave of anger is ideological or the product of an aroused Left. As Politico notes, Democrats unhappy with their party are not at all united in any ideological diagnosis or prescription:

“Despite the restive energy in the party’s progressive wing, the Democratic discontent does not seem to be centered around a desire to pull the party to the left or the right. Democrats cannot seem to agree on which direction the party should move in — recent Gallup polling found that 45 percent wanted the party to become more moderate, while 29 percent felt it should become more liberal, and 22 percent wanted it to stay the same.”

I’m reasonably sure very few of the original tea-party activists wanted the GOP to become “more moderate.”

So if an ideological uprising is not in store for Democrats, how is the current wave of anguish likely to manifest itself, or to be resolved?

Congressional leadership, rather than garden-variety Democratic incumbents, seem the most likely target of grassroots rage going forward, which would mean a shakeup within the Senate and possibly the House leadership to show a willingness to deploy more aggressive tactics. But before that sort of revolt can take shape, the underlying conditions in the country could change the intraparty dynamics. If, for example, federal courts indeed slow down or stop the most outrageous actions of Team Trump, and particularly if the Supreme Court reestablishes constitutional “guardrails,” then perhaps Democrats will become less insistent that their elected leaders throw themselves upon the MAGA ramparts. And inversely, if Trump, Musk, and company intensify their authoritarian efforts and are not restrained by the courts (either because the judiciary surrenders or is simply ignored), the anger, fear, and panic among the Democratic grassroots could move onto the streets in open resistance instead of being focused on Democratic members of Congress who obviously can’t be expected to stop an extraconstitutional coup.

In a less apocalyptic scenario, the closer we get to the 2026 midterms the more likely it is that Democratic activists will be focused on winning general elections and flipping Congress rather than on purging Democratic incumbents who have failed to turn the tide. Already, small-dollar donors are pouring money into long-shot Democratic candidacies in two Florida special elections to fill House seats.

In general, we’re not likely to see left-of-center activists don tri-corner hats and scream about DINOs out of anguish at what Trump’s doing to their country and its institutions. As longtime tea-party observer (and sometimes supporter) David French noted, it’s not a good temperamental fit anyway:

“[T]he Democratic Party is more of a party of institutions — including government institutions — than the Republican Party is now. This means they’re less likely to want a demolition than to urge a renovation. If the Tea Party revels in being the bull in the china shop and glories in the wreckage, the Democratic Party might want better inventory or new management, but it doesn’t want to trash the place.”

Despite the alleged proclivity of Democrats to form “circular firing squads” and fall into “disarray,” the odds are good that they will focus more on the common enemy.

The following article, ‘Sowing  Rural Insurgency” by Justin H. Vassallo is cross-posted from The American Prospect:

Regardless of whether one casts economic hardship, nativist bigotry, or coastal elitism as the primary cause of the Democratic Party’s disrepute in small factory towns and the farm belt, the resulting sense of alienation in rural America remains the single biggest obstacle to broadening the party’s regional power. And it has mostly stifled whatever impulse there might be to rally low-income Americans of all stripes against the crony capitalism now enveloping the American state.

Until Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) began holding rallies in Republican-held districts to address DOGE’s destructive impact on federal workers and programs, most progressives had not dared to dream of rural America as fertile ground for a backlash. But it’s central to the concept of the Rural Urban Bridge Initiative (RUBI), a group determined to breathe new life into rural organizing strategies.

More from Justin H. Vassallo

Conceived in early 2020 by Anthony Flaccavento, a small farmer, former Democratic congressional candidate, and community organizer in southern Virginia, and Erica Etelson, a political writer and former public-interest attorney based in California, RUBI is kindling a new way to approach—and ultimately advance—rural concerns within the progressive movement. Through training sessions, reports from local experts, policy development, and traditional volunteer work, RUBI hopes to depolarize rural politics and persuade other activist groups to engage in good faith with the needs, fears, and aspirations of rural communities.

RUBI’s most prominent effort to date is its campaign to convince the Democratic National Committee and the broader fundraising network on the left to devote substantially more resources to rural causes. Since Ken Martin, chair of the Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, was elected in February to head the DNC, RUBI has lobbied him to allocate $400 million—10 percent of the Democratic ad buy for the 2024 general election—toward rural districts and candidates.

Although RUBI has yet to secure Martin’s commitment, co-signatories to the public letter include Rep. Ro Khanna (D-CA), author and sociologist Arlie Hochschild, veteran Texas populist Jim Hightower, two state party chairs and dozens of county committees, and scores of other individuals and organizations alarmed by Democratic decline in rural areas. (Disclosure: I am listed among the journalists who have signed it.)

Rural strategists hope to change the narrative and trajectory of American politics by transforming the everyday ways progressives think of and relate to left-behind Americans.

Regardless of the DNC’s final decision, the campaign testifies to the perseverance of rural progressive populism. It reflects, too, a growing recognition on the part of local groups committed to the welfare of rural workers that they are not isolated in their anger over how national Democrats have burned through billions of dollars in the last several election cycles without improving their position in a single “purple” state.

During Barack Obama’s presidency, Democrats lost well over a thousand congressional, statewide, and local down-ballot offices. Tentative gains in critical presidential swing states since 2018 have been largely offset by Trump’s comeback; he won all seven in November. Other states where Democrats used to be competitive across the board, such as Florida and Ohio, are poised to go the way of Missouri, Indiana, and Arkansas.

A recent study from the Carsey School of Public Policy at the University of New Hampshire suggests that a shift among rural voters to Kamala Harris of just 3 percent could have led her to victory over Donald Trump. If even just a few dozen rural Democrats from the South and Midwest won back offices controlled by the GOP, there could be a tectonic shift in how the party competes at the gubernatorial, congressional, and presidential levels.

As RUBI’s founders know well, it is a herculean task just to get the party elite to admit the main facts—that austerity, trade shocks, and monopoly power have distressed rural America—much less own their own culpability in these issues. But although it is tempting to place all the blame on party elites, the same, unfortunately, can often be said of the major progressive groups that have cropped up since the Bush years, Flaccavento argues. The overriding focus, he says, on “call[ing] out how horrible the Republicans are 24/7” has left little energy to discuss what matters to rural folks: “jobs, employment, the economy, livelihoods, manufacturing, trade policy, [and] antitrust.”

This, then, is how rural strategists hope to change the narrative and trajectory of American politics: not through conferences, white papers, and viral media, but by transforming the everyday ways progressives think of and relate to left-behind Americans.

RUBI’S EMERGENCE, ALONGSIDE SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS like Contest Every Race, the Center for Working-Class Politics, More Perfect Union, and Dirt Road Democrats, comes at a precarious moment in national politics. Not only is the Democratic brand now routinely described as “toxic” outside of deep-blue cities and college towns, but the meaning and purpose of 21st-century progressivism seems uncertain, with many supporters believing it has deviated, at least partially, from its populist and New Deal origins. Some activists are beginning to entertain the nonpartisan path taken by independent Dan Osborn, who since losing to Republican incumbent Deb Fischer in last year’s U.S. Senate race in Nebraska, has started a Working Class Heroes Fund to back future insurgents.

But harrowing political defeats do create a window—at least temporarily—to take aim at ossified party structures and discredited strategies. For organizers like Flaccavento and Etelson, these candid assessments are essential to mapping a recovery. Though RUBI aims, in part, to overhaul the activist PR-speak that typically puts off rural and less-educated workers, Flaccavento, who is steeped in rural development issues, is frank about the big picture that most D.C. consultants and their paymasters evade.

“Even the most down-to-earth language ain’t going to cut it until we address why so many people are pissed,” he says.

A significant part of RUBI’s work involves exploring how Democrats and the modern left went wrong with rural Americans. That’s what “really differentiates us from almost every other rural group out there,” says Flaccavento, “which are more either trying to find better candidates or just trying to make the case that the Democratic Party is the right party.” Flaccavento is adamant that progressives have to comprehensively recognize that they have been in a losing battle to “persuade [blue-collar rural] people that we really are for them when they don’t buy it anymore.”

RUBI is concerned with reimagining what “bottom-up prosperity” looks like in this age of regional inequality.

RUBI’s work is about more than dissecting the weaknesses of contemporary progressivism, however. Its major policy document, “A Rural New Deal,” co-published with Progressive Democrats of America, champions and expands upon the best aspects of President Biden’s domestic legacy, particularly in the areas of antitrust enforcement and re-establishing regional supply chains.

But unlike many D.C.-based think tanks, RUBI and its allies are not trying to graft a left-leaning technocratic agenda onto rural workers based on an abstract assumption of what they most need. Instead, RUBI is concerned with reimagining what “bottom-up prosperity” looks like in this age of regional inequality, and retrieving the policy tools that give local communities “the capacity,” as Flaccavento puts it, “to solve many if not most of their problems.”

Read more…

“Bernie Sanders is not running for president. But he is drawing larger crowds now than he did when he was campaigning for the White House,” Lauren Gambino writes at The Guardian. “The message has hardly changed. Nor has the messenger, with his shock of white hair and booming delivery. What’s different now, the senator says, is that his fears – a government captured by billionaires who exploit working people – have become an undeniable reality and people are angry…The Vermont senator recalled Donald Trump’s inauguration, when the three wealthiest people on the planet – Elon Musk, Jeff Bezos and Mark Zuckerberg – were seated in front of his cabinet nominees in what many viewed as a shocking display of power and influence”…For weeks, voters have been showing up at town halls to vent their alarm and rage over the president’s aggressive power grabs and the Musk-led mass firings of federal workers. But they are also furious at the Democratic leadership, charging that their party spent an entire election season warning of the threat Trump posed to US democracy, and yet now appeared either unable or unwilling to stand up to him…“This isn’t just about Republicans, either. We need a Democratic party that fights harder for us, too,” Ocasio-Cortez said in Arizona, drawing some of the loudest, most sustained applause of the evening. She urged the crowd to help elect candidates “with the courage to brawl for the working class”…According to a memo by Sanders’ longtime adviser, Faiz Shakir, the senator has raised more than $7m from more than 200,000 donors since February, and is drawing crowds 25% to 100% larger than at the height of his presidential campaigns in 2016 and 2020. On Friday, more than 30,000 people attended a rally in Denver – the largest audience Sanders has ever drawn, his team said…Ocasio-Cortez offered a more personal touch, weaving elements of her biography into her speech – something Sanders is typically loath to do. She spoke of her mother, who cleaned homes, and her father, whose death from a rare form of cancer plunged the family into economic uncertainty…“I don’t believe in healthcare, labor and human dignity because I’m an extremist,” she said, pushing back on the rightwing caricature of her. “I believe in these things because I was a waitress.”

In “How the American Left Became Conservative,” Michael Kazin writes at The Nation: “We have to think anew about how to win the trust of Americans who have good reasons to be cynical and angry about the current state of the nation. Just repeating the same rhetoric from the past, while simply defending agencies they know little about, won’t respond to that mood or respond effectively to the current crisis…One approach would be to highlight programs like pre-kindergarten for all kids and tax credits for childcare that Republicans killed in the cradle when Biden was president. Another would be to champion ideas that would have wide appeal—but have never been attempted: class-based affirmative action and subsidies for rent in urban areas. And how many people not named Musk or Bezos would oppose Elizabeth Warren’s “wealth tax” on the 75,000 richest Americans which the Massachusetts senator predicts would raise close to $4 trillion in a decade?…Any chosen policy ought to offer a fresh approach to narrowing the gap between classes and be available, like Social Security, to everyone regardless of need…One can wish that nationalism would fade away, sometime in the future. But as long as most Americans identify with and want to be proud of their country, a nationalism of caring is the best alternative to the nativist scare-mongering of the MAGA mogul. Anyone whose embrace of Trumpism derives primarily from a hatred of immigrants or transgender people will be beyond the reach of this strategy. But surveys and exit polls from last fall’s election show that anxiety about the economy was far more common than fears about cultural displacement.”

Mike Konczal ruminates on “The Abundance Doctrine: How modern liberalism became too obsessed with saying no—and can learn to say yes again” at Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, and writes: “Bending the cost curve, getting health care to more people, and saving hundreds of billions of dollars is the definition of abundance. The efficiency of social insurance sits uneasy in the authors’ framework. In this light, the call for the expansion of Medicare and public options to save larger costs—with similar or better outcomes—might be the most important abundance intervention…Moreover, criticisms of administrative inefficiency and capture were top of mind when the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created in 2010 as part of the Dodd-Frank financial reform. Consumer protection had previously been split among at least five financial regulators, leaving no single agency with the incentive, staffing, or expertise to do it well. The CFPB’s structure and funding were purposely designed to protect it from capture, and it has successfully returned more than $21 billion to consumers and produced rules addressing issues such as abuses in mortgage markets and student debt. Precisely because of these successes, ones that reformers can learn from, dismantling the CFPB has been a central goal of President Trump and Elon Musk…These examples complicate the narrative that Democrats just can’t get anything done. But that doesn’t mean we should duck from a more serious conversation about government action. It remains unclear what comes next for liberals and progressives, and there is a desperate urgency to figure out what ideological frameworks might fill the void. The Trump Administration’s plans for retrenchment, isolationism, tariffs, and deportations risk putting us on a path to severe stagnation, akin to the one the UK has suffered since Brexit. Liberals must offer an alternative, and one path is to put forth a vision built around future-oriented growth. While it isn’t clear either way whether abundance is a good electoral strategy, the priorities it flags have gone missing in recent decades. And if we can’t offer a more prosperous future while also delivering on the things we promise, why should voters trust us?”

“Toward a Foreign Policy for the Working Class” by Mohammed Soliman and Andrew Hanna at The National Interest, argues “Despite the brightest minds serving at the highest levels of government, Washington offers little tangible to the American working class struggling with rising costs and increasing threats to their security…Meanwhile, the American working class—which is rapidly diversifying—has reshaped the country’s politics. Working-class voters have played a decisive role in the past three major presidential elections, realigning both major parties away from the post-Cold War consensus on free trade and military intervention overseas… The political center of gravity in America has shifted toward the working class on both sides of the aisle. This is a good thing. There is an opportunity now to make the bipartisan populist shift actually serve the American working class. To revive the American Dream, national security elites should reorient their efforts away from defending broken global institutions and toward relentlessly advancing the interests of the American working class…Our leaders must confidently express their faith in America as a force for good in the world. This new American faith is not blind patriotism or nativist jingoism but a deep, unwavering trust in the American experiment. It is a belief in the enduring promise of America as a beacon of hope, a place where individual liberty remains sacred and inviolable. It is the conviction that this nation, flawed yet striving, can still light the way for the world.”

The following article by Ruy Teixeira, politics editor of The Liberal Patriot newsletter, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute,  and author of major works of political analysis, is cross-posted from The Liberal Patriot:

Trump’s approval rating has declined to the point where his approval is “underwater”—that is, his net approval (approval minus disapproval) has turned negative in the both the RCP and Silver Bulletin running averages. And his net approval rating is even more negative (-8) on the all-important issue of the economy, Trump’s key issue in the 2024 election. Polls regularly show gloomy voter assessments of the economy’s current trajectory. In a recent Echelon Insights survey, voters by 17 points say the economy is getting worse rather than improving and by 18 points that their personal financial situation is getting worse rather than improving.

This raises the hope in Democratic hearts that voters are wising up to how terrible Trump is for the economy and the country and that a combination of #Resisteverything and a thermostatic reaction against the incumbent Trump administration will rekindle their political fortunes. This is a comforting take for Democratic partisans because it implies that a combination of stout-hearted opposition and waiting around for the sky to fall on Trump will suffice; no need to do anything drastic like actually changing toxic party positions and doing serious surgery on the party brand.

I think there are grounds for considerable skepticism here. The hole the Democrats are in is so deep that it is doubtful that the comforting take is the right one. Their problems are just too severe. I round up here a series of recent survey and analytical results plus new findings from the 2024 election that illustrate how deep the Democrats’ hole truly is.

1. Views of the Democratic Party. You’d think that as Trump runs into difficulties and sows chaos, voters would like Democrats more. They do not. Instead, Democrats’ favorability among voters is scraping the bottom. In a March CNN poll, favorability toward the Democratic Party clocked in at 29 percent, down ten points since right before the 2024 election and the lowest rating for the Democrats in the CNN poll since its inception in 1992. Trump’s job approval among working-class (non-college) respondents in the poll was 20 points higher than their favorability toward the Democratic Party. The working class does not appear to be warming to the Democrats.

In a March NBC poll, the Democratic Party’s favorability was even lower, 27 percent. The rating was the lowest in that poll since 1990. Among independents, the party’s favorability was an abysmal 11 percent vs. 56 percent unfavorable. These voters may not love Donald Trump but they really don’t like the Democrats.

In a February Blueprint Research poll, about two-thirds of voters thought the Democrats don’t have a workable strategy for responding to Trump and around the same number found this take on the Democrats persuasive: ”No one has any idea what the Democratic Party stands for anymore, other than opposing Donald Trump. Democrats have no message, no plan of their own, and no one knows what they would do if they got back into power. If Democrats ever want to win elections again, people need a clear message from them about what they stand for and what they’ll do.” Ouch.

On the plus side, voters in a February Navigator Research poll across the battleground Congressional districts thought Democrats in Congress “fight for what they believe.” However, they also thought Democrats don’t respect work, don’t share my values, don’t look out for working people, don’t value work, don’t care about people like me, don’t have the right priorities and, by a massive 47 points, don’t get things done. Double ouch.

There’s lots of polling data along these lines and they send a clear message: Democrats’ image is atrocious and therefore cannot present an attractive alternative to Trump and the GOP.

2. Identification with the Democratic Party. Nothing looms as large in driving political behavior than party identification: which party voters identify with or lean toward. Lately something astonishing has happened: Republicans have led in party identification for three straight years, which hasn’t happened in nearly a century. This trend shows no sign of abating in the aftermath of the election.

And the GOP is outregistering Democrats in key swing states like Pennsylvania, Nevada, and North Carolina. Indeed, over time, just four states—California, Colorado, Delaware and New York—have seen Democrats out registering Republicans compared to 22 states where Republicans have been gaining.

3. Leaving Democratic states. There’s no more meaningful vote than where you choose to live. And right now the trend is strongly against blue states and in favor of red states like Florida and Texas. This is implicitly a harsh judgement on Democratic governance.

My Liberal Patriot colleague Nate Moore has the facts:

Since Covid, the biggest blue states have dramatically lagged behind the biggest Republican states in population growth. Between 2020 and 2024, California, New York, and Illinois each lost more than 100,000 thousand residents. Florida and Texas, meanwhile, both gained around 2 million residents. The disparity is shocking.

It is tempting to chalk up the unprecedented decline to Covid. Now that the pandemic has faded, numbers will even out, some might argue. Nothing more than a blip. But the most recent figures confirm that the reasons behind the blue-state population decline run much deeper than Covid. Even though case counts are a thing of the past, populous red states continue to lap their blue counterparts. Between July 2023 and July 2024, Florida and Texas gained more than 1 million residents combined. Illinois, New York, and California barely broke 400,000 cumulatively.

That’s bad but consider the electoral implications:

Estimates from the American Redistricting Project predict that California is on track to lose three House seats—and three electoral votes—after 2030’s reapportionment. New York could drop 2 seats. Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Illinois all might lose a seat. Meanwhile, Texas and Florida are each projected to gain a whopping 4 seats. Idaho and Utah, too, will tack on an additional seat.

Notice a pattern? The states projected to gain representation—and an Electoral College boost—are overwhelmingly Trump states. The states projected to lose representation are Harris states.

Yup, where people choose to live matters. And increasingly they don’t want to live where Democrats are in charge.

4. No Democrats where you need ‘em. Wherever you find dense concentrations of highly educated voters you’ll find plenty of Democrats. As for the rest of the country—not so much. This is a big, big problem, not just in presidential elections but critically in Senate elections where every state, no matter its education level, gets the same two Senators.

Bill Galston and Elaine Kamarck have the relevant facts:

Although Democrats won all the states with shares of BA degree holders at 40 percent or higher in 2024, there were only 12 of them, none swing states. By contrast, Democrats won only one of the 29 states with BA shares at 35 percent or lower while prevailing in seven of the 10 states with college attainment between 36 and 39 percent. [Note that the only swing state in the 36-39 percent group, North Carolina, was carried by Trump—RT] And because ticket-splitting between presidential and senatorial races has become more infrequent, the new class-based politics bodes ill for Democrats’ U.S. Senate prospects as well.

It turns out being widely disliked in huge parts of the country matters. A lot.

These four factors indicate a party that is truly in a deep hole. The party’s severe image, identification, governance, and geographic weaknesses cannot be remedied by mounting the (rhetorical) barricades against Trump and waiting for his administration to self-destruct. This may make the partisan faithful happy but it is woefully inadequate as a program to bring the party back to full health.

Unfortunately, that so many Democrats are wedded to #Resisteverything—starting with the defenestration of Chuck Schumer—rather than making the Democrats into a party more voters actually like shows the depth of denial in the party. They think they’re on the verge of a breakthrough if they just toughen up. They are not.

Perhaps some fresh data from the 2024 election can shock them back to their senses. I’ll write more about these data in coming weeks but here are some of the most startling findings from a tranche of data analysis just released by David Shor’s Blue Rose Research firm.

5. Democrats did worse in the 2024 election than you think. They completely failed to win over less engaged voters, who are becoming much more Republican. The higher the turnout, the more these voters show up and the worse it is for Democrats. Shor’s analysis indicates that if everyone had voted last year Trump would have won the popular vote by five points rather than a point and a half. Low turnout is now the Democrats’ BFF!

Hispanics are overwhelmingly moderate to conservative in ideology. It’s been well-documented that Hispanic conservatives have been shifting dramatically to the right in their voting patterns. But Shor’s new data establishes that Hispanic moderates are now joining the party. There was a 24-point decline in the Democratic advantage among this group from 2020 to 2024 and since 2016 there’s been a total 46-point margin shift away from the Democrats. Hispanic moderates (almost half of Hispanic voters) are now voting very similarly to white moderates.

More broadly, ideological polarization among all nonwhites is shifting moderate to conservative voters away form the Democrats. This is making nonwhite voters less reliable constituencies for Democrats.

Shor’s data also indicate that immigrant voters swung from a +27 Biden constituency in 2020 to a Trump +1 group in 2024. Wow.

Shor’s analysis also suggests that Trump outright won voters under 30. Double wow. He also finds that Gen Z voters under 25 regardless of race or gender are now more conservative than the corresponding Millennial voters. So much for the Democrats’ generational tsunami.

The issue landscape in 2024 was worse than most Democrats thought. The only really important issue Democrats had an advantage on was health care and that advantage was tiny by historical standards. The Democrats did have a large advantage on climate change—but voters don’t really care about the issue.

There’s plenty more in the Blue Rose analysis plus interesting discussion and data nuggets in two interviews Shor did with Vox and with the New York Times. But the totality of the data really does underscore how deep a hole Democrats are currently in. The way out is not with a feel-good Democratic playbook that leaves Democratic shibboleths intact. That hasn’t worked and it won’t work.

Instead Democrats should consider the approach recommended by John Judis (full disclosure: Judis was my co-author on Where Have All the Democrats Gone?) in his bracing new article on the Compact website.

To reverse their fortunes, the Democrats must alter their image in voters’ minds. Above all, they must be seen again as the party of the “normal American” and “the real America.” The last time they succeeded in doing a makeover like this was in the 1992 election when a group of politicians and political operatives, working through a group called the Democratic Leadership Council, turned around voters’ perception of the Democrats as weak on crime and defense and opposed to any reform of the welfare system. The DLC’s former president Bill Clinton won in 1992 on the DLC’s platform. I don’t suggest that the Democrats need to mimic the content of the DLC platform, particularly on economic and trade issues, but they do need to transform their image, or what political consultants call their “brand.”

Some commentators have insisted the Democrats’ defeat had nothing to do with “wokeness.” That is a fatal misreading. The Democratic makeover must start with the panoply of cultural and socio-economic stands that Republicans were able to use in 2024 to discredit Democratic candidates. These include the Democrats’ positions on immigration, sex and gender, affirmative action, criminal justice, and climate change. A candidate like Sherrod Brown in Ohio had said all the right things about economics and labor for decades, but he was defeated by a candidate who linked him to the Democrats’ stances on social issues.

I’m not suggesting Democrats should hypocritically adopt positions that are wrong-headed. In rejecting the participation of biological males in competitive women’s sports, as California Gov. Gavin Newsom did recently, Democrats would have biology and public opinion on their side. The same goes for policies that have encouraged street crime and illegal immigration. A more difficult issue is climate change. Democrats are right to reject Republican claims that it is a hoax or needs no serious attention—indeed, the Trump administration is actively discouraging the transition to renewable energy. But in order to win public support for any climate measures, Democrats will have to tone down their apocalyptic rhetoric and abandon unrealistic goals for achieving net-zero emissions. That would include, for instance, supporting natural gas as a transitional fuel and nuclear energy as a feasible alternative to fossil fuels.

Great advice. But I’m not holding my breath on when Democrats might choose to follow it. They’re too busy pretending the deep hole they’re in is just a shallow indentation and vanquishing Trump is right around the corner.

Bernie Sanders said something this week that really upset this yellow-dog Democrat, so I wrote about it at New York:

At a time when plenty of people have advice for unhappy progressive Democrats, one of their heroes, Bernie Sanders, had a succinct message: Don’t love the party, leave it. In an interview with the New York Times, he previewed a barnstorming tour he has undertaken with Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez but made it clear he wouldn’t be asking audiences to rally ’round the Democratic Party. “One of the aspects of this tour is to try to rally people to get engaged in the political process and run as independents outside of the Democratic Party,” Sanders said.

In one respect, that isn’t surprising. Though he has long aligned with the Democratic Party in Congress and has regularly backed its candidates, Sanders has always self-identified as an independent, even when he filed to run for president as a Democrat in 2020. Now, as before, he seems to regard the Democratic Party as inherently corrupted by its wealthy donor base, per the Times:

“During the interview on Wednesday, Mr. Sanders repeatedly criticized the influence of wealthy donors and Washington consultants on the party. He said that while Democrats had been a force for good on social issues like civil rights, women’s rights and L.G.B.T.Q. rights, they had failed on the economic concerns he has dedicated his political career to addressing.”

Still, when Democrats are now already perceived as losing adherents, and as many progressives believe their time to take over the party has arrived, Sanders’s counsel is both oddly timed and pernicious. Yes, those on the left who choose independent status may still work with Democrats on both legislative and electoral projects, much as Sanders does. And they may run in and win Democratic primaries on occasion without putting on the party yoke. But inevitably, refusing to stay formally within the Democratic tent will cede influence to centrists and alienate loyalist voters as well. And in 18 states, voters who don’t register as Democrats may be barred from voting in Democratic primaries, which proved a problem for Sanders during his two presidential runs.

More fundamentally, Democrats need both solidarity and stable membership at this moment with the MAGA wolf at the door and crucial off-year and midterm elections coming up. Staying in the Democratic ranks doesn’t mean giving up progressive principles or failing to challenge timid or ineffective leadership. To borrow an ancient cigarette-ad slogan, it’s a time when it’s better to “fight than switch.”

That said, there may be certain deep-red parts of the country where the Democratic brand is so toxic that an independent candidacy could make some sense for progressives. The example of 2024 independent Senate candidate Dan Osborn of Nebraska, who ran a shockingly competitive (if ultimately unsuccessful) race against Republican incumbent Deb Fischer, turned a lot of heads. But while Osborn might have been a “populist” by most standards, he wasn’t exactly what you’d call a progressive, and in fact, centrist and progressive Nebraska Democrats went along with Osborn as a very long shot. They didn’t abandon their party; they just got out of the way.

Someday the popularity of electoral systems without party primaries or with ranked-choice voting may spread to the point where candidates and voters alike will gradually shed or at least weaken party labels. Then self-identifying as an independent could be both principled and politically pragmatic.

But until then, it’s important to understand why American politics have regularly defaulted to a two-party system dating all the way back to those days when the Founders tried strenuously to avoid parties altogether. In a first-past-the-post system where winners take all, there’s just too much at stake to allow those with whom you are in agreement on the basics to splinter. That’s particularly true when the other party is rigidly united in subservience to an authoritarian leader. Sanders is one of a kind in his ability to keep his feet both within and outside the Democratic Party. His example isn’t replicable without making a bad situation for progressives a whole lot worse.